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Delta Air Lines acquired an oil refinery in April 2012 as a strategic move to hedge against 
higher fuel prices. Our paper analyzes the oil refinery acquisition, a backward integration 
strategy, on the airline’s financial and operational performance, for the period Q1 2010 to Q2 
2015. The methodology involves descriptive statistics and short-term stock performance as well 
as an econometric model that estimates the impact of the oil refinery acquisition on Delta Air 
Lines’ net income. The data set consists of quarterly financial and airline operations metrics 
data. The results indicate that it is too early to ascertain whether Delta Air Lines’ oil refinery 
acquisition has any positive impact on its financial performance since the variable of interest is 
insignificant in predicting Delta Air Lines’ net income. Despite the apparent lack of positive 
impact of its oil refinery acquisition, however, the stock market has rewarded Delta Air Lines’ 
strategy resulting in its share prices outperforming the S&P 500 and the XAL, an index of  major 
airline stocks, in the 60-trading day period following the announcement of its acquisition. 
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Introduction 
Firms are faced with many decisions related to the sourcing of goods and services used within 
the organization. The decision to source internally or buy from outside the firm has implications 
for the organizational structure, resources, and control of operations, as well as on the firm’s 
overall operational performance and productivity. Firms that choose internal sourcing or 
ownership of key supplies are vertically integrated while firms that deal at arm’s length with 
outside suppliers have chosen to outsource these activities. While the decision to make-or-buy 
has been widely researched in the management literature (Lafontaine and Slade, 2007), the 
financial implications are not always clear (David and Han, 2004). 
 
In April 2012, Delta Air Lines shocked the aviation industry by announcing its plan to acquire 
the oil refinery in Trainer, Pennsylvania (PA), which was formerly owned by Phillips 66. This 
refinery had accounted for up to one-third of the jet-kerosene capacity of the East Coast in the 
United States (US) before its closure (Mouawadi, 2012). Delta Air Lines paid USD 150 million 
for the facility and expected to invest an additional USD 100 million to upgrade the plant. With 
oil over USD 90 a barrel and 2011 fuel costs of USD 11.8 billion or 36 percent of its operating 
expenses, Delta Air Lines made a compelling argument for the unusual acquisition 
(EconMatters, 2012). The purchase appeared to be a modest one compared with the projected 
annual fuel savings of USD 300 million. Further, Delta Air Lines CEO Richard H. Anderson 
noted that the airline would have to buy 60 new generation narrow-body aircraft at roughly USD 
2.5 billion to achieve similar savings (Mouawadi, 2012). 
 
Operating new and fuel-efficient aircraft is one way to manage fuel costs while fuel hedging is 
another. Southwest Airlines, the first low-cost carrier (LCC) to operate in the US, led the 
industry in fuel hedging as a way for airlines to manage the increasingly volatile price of fuel. 
When fuel was trading over USD 90 a barrel in 2007 Southwest Airlines was enjoying long-term 
contracts to buy oil at USD 51 a barrel through 2009 and watching as competitors began posting 
growing operational losses (Bailey, 2007). Unfortunately, even a master at hedging like 
Southwest Airlines does not always play the market right as 2014 proved—Southwest Airlines 
was caught off guard by falling prices resulting in a net liability of USD 236 million 
(Schlangenstein and Murtaugh, 2014). Airlines are again rethinking hedging in 2016 amid falling 
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oil prices. Southwest Airlines has announced that its outstanding hedges may result in a loss of 
USD 1.8 billion through 2018 (Dastin, 2016). 
 
With this history of ‘managing’ fuel costs, analysts are still uncertain about the recent action by 
Delta Air Lines. While market analysts have given Delta Air Lines credit for this ‘innovative 
approach’, the strategy has provoked a number of questions. The Trainer, PA oil refinery was an 
older facility that relied on an expensive grade of crude oil and had been closed because the 
crack spread, the difference between the price of a barrel of oil and the sale price of the refined 
product, did not make economic sense for Phillips 66. Many observers are unclear on how Delta 
Air Lines would change this situation. Other questions raised by the acquisition include how 
Delta Air Lines projected its fuel savings, what effect lower fuel prices might have on the 
operations of the oil refinery, and whether the airline would have been better off pursuing a 
hedging strategy rather than vertical integration (EconMatters, 2012; Kemp, 2014). The refinery 
did report its first overall profit in the third quarter (Q3) of 2013, posted a USD 19 million profit 
for Q3 2014 and a USD 75 million profit for the fourth quarter (Q4) of 2014 (Loyd, 2014). While 
the airline reported an adjusted jet fuel price of USD 2.90 per gallon in 2014, eight cents lower 
than rival American Airlines, total fuel costs were higher due to increased consumption and 
hedging losses, and the fuel price for Delta Air Lines was not different from the pre-refinery 
price (Kemp, 2014; Loyd, 2014). Moreover, the oil refinery does not blend renewable fuels and 
must purchase renewable fuel credits, a further expense to this strategy (Anderson, 2014; 
Reuters, 2013). In short, the success of this strategy is not clear based on the complexities 
involved in operating an oil refinery. 
 
While airline financial performance has been the subject of a great deal of research exploring 
issues from airline safety (Adrangi et al., 1997; Graham and Bowes, 1979) to outsourcing 
(Raghavan and Rhoades, 2008) to mergers or acquisitions (Manuela Jr. and Rhoades, 2013 and 
2014; Manuela Jr. et al., 2016; Singal, 1996) to hedging (Lim and Hong, 2014; Morell and Swan, 
2006 ), there has yet to be any research focusing on the financial implications of oil refinery 
purchase since Delta Air Lines is the first carrier to pursue this audacious strategy. The purpose 
of this study is to analyze the impact of the oil refinery acquisition on the financial and 
operational performance of the airline using financial ratios and short-term stock performance as 
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well as an econometric model that includes financial and airline operations variables, e.g., fuel 
cost per available seat mile (ASM), to provide additional evidence of the viability of this vertical 
integration acquisition.  
 
Make-or-Buy 
While different theories exist to explain organizational vertical integration decisions, the notion 
of vertical integration can be traced back to the early arguments of Adam Smith and the division 
of labor, although organization theory traces its roots to the Coase (1937) article on the role of 
transaction costs in shaping the structure of an industry. Williamson (1975 and 1991) went on to 
develop the argument that arm’s-length contracts may under certain circumstances impose costs 
on the firm that could be alleviated through ownership and that frequency, uncertainty, and asset 
specificity were expected to determine the extent to which vertical integration (ownership) would 
reduce transaction costs. Harrigan (1984) argues that the major advantages of vertical integration 
include reduced cost due to the elimination of duplicate overhead, improved coordination of 
activities, improved access to inputs and services, superior control of a firm’s economic 
environment, and synergies created by the coordination of vertical activities, although vertical 
integration could lead to increased overhead for the coordination of the vertical firm, excess 
capacity due to unbalanced economies of scale, creation of mobility (or exit) barriers, and loss of 
information from suppliers. Thus, vertical integration may have as many disadvantages and 
advantages. Harrigan (1985: 398) notes that firms “may enjoy benefits of vertical integration 
without transferring all of their output internally” and argues that there are a number of 
conditions under which vertical integration makes greater sense—the demand for the product is 
uncertain, the industry is stable (low competition, low exit barriers, low rate of technological 
change), the bargaining power with suppliers is low, and premium prices offset the high cost of 
excess capacity. 
 
Empirical studies on vertical integration have not resolved the question of when ownership 
should be pursued over contractual outsourcing. David and Han (2004) report on a review of 63 
empirical papers on transaction cost economics (TCE) that found mixed results despite the fact 
that TCE was one of the most frequently examined issues in the make-or-buy literature. 
Parmigiani (2007) argues that sourcing decisions should be viewed from multiple theoretical 
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points of view rather than just TCE and presents results that support a strategy of concurrent 
sourcing (making-and-buying) as a third option for firms. 
 
If TCE argues for the benefits of a vertically integrated firm, then the resource-based view 
(RBV) of the firm is seen as an argument for focusing on what you do best and outsourcing the 
rest. According to RBV, internal resources and capabilities are the source of sustained 
competitive advantage and should drive the decision making on what form the organizational 
structure should take (Barney, 1991 and 1996). Firms should focus on their core competencies as 
a means of achieving sustained competitive advantage and outsource activities to other firms 
with expertise in their non-core activities, since outsourcing may result in reduced costs, reduced 
investment, and less fixed costs (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). While outsourcing has been the 
dominant trend for several decades, there is limited and conflicting research on firm profitability. 
Gilley and Rasheed (2000) have argued that the cost savings of outsourcing may be 
overestimated as the transaction costs may be significant and outsourcing requires a shift in 
overhead allocation, and that short-run cost improvements may create an outsourcing spiral that 
eventually erodes the resources and capabilities of the firm. 
 
Thus, the extensive research on make-or-buy and the best organizational structure reports mixed 
results on financial and operating performance outcomes. The tension between these two 
competing ideas—vertical integration and outsourcing—continues to affect the organizational 
structure of various industries including the airline industry, which has shifted from a high level 
of integration to increasing outsourcing of activities. 
 
Following the Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) principle, which can be applied to the 
context of discovery and justification of scientific theories (Mackonis, 2013), a third theoretical 
perspective that explains vertical integration decision, which appears to be the most consistent 
with Delta Air Lines’ oil refinery acquisition decision, is the Resource Dependence Theory 
(Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1976; Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). Considered as a foundation for 
theoretical reasoning, IBE first observes some phenomena, link the observed phenomena to 
existing and already accepted scientific knowledge, and then argue for the plausibility of the 
theory that explains the phenomena (Mackonis, 2013). Thagrad (1978) argues that the IBE 
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principle consists in accepting a hypothesis that provides a better explanation than alternative 
hypotheses, which seems to justify a selected hypothesis on the grounds that the hypothesis 
provides the best explanation for the observed phenomena.  As such, the Resource Dependence 
Theory (RDT), which was formalized in the work of Pfeffer and Salancik “The External Control 
of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective” (1978), provides an alternative argument 
to the many economic theories regarding mergers, acquisitions, and contracts (Pfeffer, 2003). 
Moreover, RDT adds the not-always rational concept of power and autonomy to the discussion 
of organizational structure and dependence. When a firm is dependent on another partner for 
some key resource, the firm loses autonomy and cedes power to that organization causing 
pressure to build to correct these conditions. 
 
The RDT emphasizes three core ideas, arguing that social context matters, organizations have 
strategies to enhance their autonomy and pursue their interests, and that power is important for 
understanding the internal and external actions of organizations (Davis and Cobb, 2009). The 
theory suggests that one approach to manage resource dependency is to incorporate resources 
within the organization through mergers and acquisitions (M&As). This strategy can take three 
forms: (1) vertical integration by buying and controlling suppliers or buyers, which extends 
organizational control over vital exchanges; (2) horizontal integration by buying competitors to 
increase organizational dominance and market power by reducing competition; and (3) 
diversification or conglomerate merger strategies, which decrease the primary organization’s 
dependency on other organizations (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  
 
In the context of this study, Delta Air Lines would be driven to find a governing relationship that 
minimizes its uncertainty and dependence on its oil exchange partners and maximizes its own 
autonomy. Fuel is a critical resource for an airline and volatile fuel expenses can be the 
difference in profit or loss. While fuel hedging has been used for a number of years in the airline 
industry, Morrell and Swan (2006) argue that fuel hedging has very limited value for airlines or 
investors and while hedging may reduce swings in profitability, fuel hedging strategy cannot 
improve overall airline performance. Given these airline issues with fuel and hedging, the 
literature on resource dependence provides a number of other organizational responses to reduce 
dependence and uncertainty with organizational growth, alliances, and associations with other 
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business groups (Scott and Davis, 2007), co-opting strategies (Pfeffer, 1987), cooperation and 
competition or co-opetition (Brandenberger and Nalebuff, 1996), and ownership providing a 
range of actions from the least to the most constraining (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003; Thompson, 
1967).  Casciaro and Piskorski report that mutual interdependence (rather than dependence) is a 
better predictor of M&As and argue that the existence of power imbalances actually curtails 
M&As, suggesting that a merger or acquisition is more likely when the power imbalance 
between firms is less. Moreover, Davis and Cobb (2010) argue that RDT applies to situations or 
periods marked by economic crisis, dissatisfaction with political leadership, and increased social 
activism. The airline industry has certainly experienced a number of crises in recent years that 
would incline airline management teams to look favorably at options that would give them 
greater autonomy and power. 
 
Industry Structure 
In the early years of the aviation industry, William Boeing dreamed of a truly integrated 
company that would include an airframe and engine manufacturer as well as an airline. The Air 
Mail scandal put an end to this dream when the US government forced the United Aircraft and 
Transport Corporation to split into three separate entities (Bauer, 2006). Although the separation 
between the supplier of the essential component of an airline (airframe and engine) from the 
airline itself has continued, however, there has been experimentation within the industry between 
vertical integration and outsourced contractual agreements on other supplied components and 
services. While government regulations would limit the extent to which some activities could be 
outsourced for safety reasons, airlines have experimented with ownership and outsourcing of a 
number of activities including catering (King, 2001), baggage-handling (Keeney, 2015), 
maintenance (Al-Kaabi et al., 2007), distribution channels (Cheng, 2009), and regional aircraft 
operations (Forbes and Lederman, 2010). Since the three largest cost items for airlines are fuel, 
labor, and distribution, activities that reduce the costs of fuel and distribution or the number of 
direct airline employees have received a great deal of attention (Rhoades, 2014).  
 
The distribution channel is an important part of any firm value chain. Prior to the 1990s, all 
computer reservation systems were owned or affiliated with one or more airlines, giving owner 
airlines unfair advantage over competitors, which resulted in government regulation. With 
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airlines offering commissions to travel agents for tickets sold, distribution costs represent the 
third largest expense for airlines, but with the Internet and the spread of electronic commerce 
airline distribution dramatically changed, shortening the value chain and changing the dynamics 
of the distribution channels. Travel agents lost much of their power and profit while airlines and 
new Internet travel sites moved to capture market share (Bloch and Segev, 1997). In 2001 five 
major US carriers formed Orbitz, an online distribution company, to compete with Expedia and 
Travelocity. Evidence indicates, however, that this effort at vertical integration did not improve 
efficiency, making things even worse for the airlines (Cheng, 2009). Cendant, a company with a 
number of online travel booking brands, eventually acquired Orbitz in 2004 (Reed, 2004). 
 
Following the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, US airlines moved to establish a hub-and-spoke 
network of routes where smaller aircraft served to concentrate passengers in key cities to fill 
larger aircraft traveling between major airline hubs. Should airlines own the operators of these 
smaller aircraft (often referred to as regional airlines) or simply deal with these operators on a 
contractual basis? Forbes and Lederman (2010) report that major carriers are more likely to use 
owned regional carriers on routes where operational uncertainties such as weather are present 
and when the route is more integrated to their network, allowing them to more efficiently re-
optimize their networks when a schedule readjustment is necessary. Despite the general 
efficiency reported by Forbes and Lederman (2010), Delta Air Lines has alternated between 
ownership of and contract with its regional airline partners—Atlantic Southeast Airlines and 
Comair were contract carriers that became wholly-owned subsidiaries before reverting to 
contractual arms of the airline (Expressjet, 2015). 
 
Since 2002, jet fuel prices have risen five-fold to become the single largest expense of airlines. 
Airlines do not generally have long-term contracts with fuel suppliers and have sought ways of 
dealing with volatile oil prices because the outcomes are significant. American Airlines notes 
that every 10 percent increase in fuel prices can reduce operating margins by 1.7 percent (Morell 
and Swan, 2006). Airlines have sought to address oil price fluctuations by either increasing fuel 
efficiency, passing increases on to customers, or engaging in hedging strategies, usually within a 
twelve-month window. Jet fuel hedging, a risk management corporate strategy (Compart, 2012; 
Lim and Hong, 2014; Morrell and Swan, 2006), creates value either by reducing the expected 
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costs of underinvestment or reducing the expected financial distress costs, providing greater tax 
benefits from increased leverage, or increasing the firm’s holdings of corporate securities, which 
can increase risk aversion (Carter et al., 2006).   
 
Airlines investment strategies are positively correlated with jet fuel costs and jet fuel hedging is 
positively related to the firm value of the airline, since higher fuel prices invariably lead to lower 
cash flows (Carter et al., 2006). While investors usually place higher valuation on hedging 
companies when hedging provides positive payoffs, the literature does not indicate whether firm 
value is positively correlated with the amount of hedging, although hedging can provide an 
exceptional value for airlines close to bankruptcy (Morrell and Swan, 2006). Since the 
theoretical justification for fuel hedging is weak and the expected value of a fuel hedge is zero, 
hedging strategies do not improve airline profits, but tend to reduce swings in profits, suggesting 
that investors should not reward reduced profit volatility with higher stock prices (Morrell and 
Swan, 2006). Using US airline data from 2000 to 2012, Lim and Hong (2014) report that fuel 
hedging airlines have about nine to 12 percent lower operating costs, although this effect was not 
statistically significant, and suggest that while the perceived benefit of fuel hedging is cost 
reduction, airline strategy should focus more on lowering fuel expenses. Since the overall goal of 
hedging is to reduce uncertainty in jet fuel prices and because uncertainty in fuel prices has been 
decreasing over the past few years, use of hedging strategies is becoming less effective than in 
the past (Berghöfer and Lucey, 2014).  
 
Given the mixed theoretical and practical issues surrounding hedging, other options for 
managing fuel volatility are under consideration. According to Delta Air Lines, the ownership 
and reconfiguration of the Trainer, PA oil refinery to produce more jet fuel has lowered prices 
five to 10 cents overall for the industry and will eventually produce company-specific benefits in 
time as the oil refinery supplies an increasing share of Delta Air Lines’ jet fuel needs (Kemp, 
2014). Critics contend that buying a refinery is not a good way to ‘hedge’ against fuel prices 
since the cost are driven by the price of oil, not the margins of the refiners, and suggest that Delta 
Air Lines would have been better served by waiting for oil prices to drop and maintaining 
capacity controls that allow them to pass on higher fuel prices to consumers (Helman, 2015; 
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Kemp, 2014). Thus, industry observers are once again divided on the strategic value of airline 
action to deal with fuel costs. 
 
Empirical Framework 
Firm size (Hansen and Wernerfelt, 1989; Jensen, 1986; Lee and Hooy, 2012) and industry 
competition (Olson and Slater, 2002; Porter, 2008) usually predict firm performance or 
profitability since larger firms tend to have more resources and perhaps more and better 
capabilities, allowing them to compete favorably against their competitors, while industries with 
fewer competitors and high entry barriers tend to be less competitive, enhancing the incumbent 
firms’ chances of making a profit (Besanko et al., 2013; Porter, 2008; Stanley and Olson, 2002). 
Specifically, capacity (Ayres, 1988; Mantin and Wang, 2012; Manuela Jr., 2011; Pearson et al., 
2015), load factor (Mantin and Wang, 2012; Antoniou, 1992), number of passengers (Manuela 
Jr., 2011), number of routes or route structure (de Arantes Gomes Eller and Moreira, 2014; 
Manuela Jr., 2011), freight revenues (Antoniou, 1992), operating costs and newer aircraft 
(Antoniou, 1992; de Arantes Gomes Eller and Moreira, 2014), employee productivity (Mantin 
and Wang, 2012), and management quality (de Arantes Gomes Eller and Moreira, 2014) tend to 
have an impact on airline profits. We use a number of these variables in Equation 1 to estimate 
the impact of Delta Air Lines’ oil refinery acquisition on its financial performance and argue that 
the acquisition should have a positive impact on Delta Air Lines’ financial performance in the 
long term, especially when oil prices are high. 
 
We used the US personal consumption expenditures (PCE) as proxy for the impact of a growing 
economy on Delta Air Lines’ net income because PCE tracks closer to the behavior of the 
airline’s net income from the first quarter (Q1) of 2010 to the second quarter (Q2) of 2015 than 
the US gross domestic product (GDP) and the transportation and warehousing (TW) growth 
rates. Due to the endogeneity of the passenger, frequency, and fuel cost per ASM variables in the 
profit equation, the econometric model is estimated using instrumental variables. In the 2SLS 
estimation, we used the number of seats, TW, passenger revenue per revenue passenger mile 
(PRRPM), and passenger revenue per ASM (PRASM) as instruments to estimate the passenger 
variable while the load factor, total revenue passenger miles (RPMs) of the US airline industry 
excluding Delta Air Lines’ RPMs, and total revenue ton miles (RTMs) of the US airline industry 
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excluding Delta Air Lines’ RTMs were used as instruments to estimate the frequency variable. 
We used the average age of Delta Air Lines’ aircraft, GDP, jet fuel price per gallon, and 
operating cost as instruments to estimate fuel cost per ASM in the 2SLS estimation. The RPMs 
and RTMs of the US airline industry represent the impact of Delta Air Lines’ competitors on its 
departure frequency and route network decisions, which impact its revenues and net income.   
 
Equation 1 
PROFIT (t) = β0 + β1 PASSENGER (t) + β2 FREQUENCY (t) + β3 ROUTE (t) + β4 PCE (t) +  
β5 FUEL (t) + β6 REFINERY (t) + ε  
Where for each quarter t,  
PROFIT  net income in billion USD 
PASSENGER  number of enplaned passengers in millions  
FREQUENCY number of departures in thousands  
ROUTE  number of city pairs served 
PCE   growth rate of personal consumption expenditures  
FUEL fuel cost per ASM 
REFINERY dummy variable representing Delta Air Lines’ oil refinery acquisition, 
which assumes a value of “1” from Q2 2012 to Q2 2015 and “0” otherwise  
ε   error term 
 
Delta Air Lines’ profit or net income should respond positively with an increase in the number 
of enplaned passengers, number of routes served, a growing economy that results in higher 
personal consumption expenditures, and its acquisition of the oil refinery while profits should 
decrease with frequency and fuel cost per ASM. The PCE serves as a control variable so we do 
not inappropriately attribute any changes in Delta Air Lines’ profitability to its oil refinery 
acquisition. 
 
In addition to the econometric model, we use descriptive statistics using graphs to help explain 
the estimation results and show how the major variables of interest behave over time. We also 
show the graphs of the abnormal returns of Delta Air Lines against the Standard and Poor’s 
(S&P) 500 and the NYSE ARCA Airline Index (XAL), an index of major airline stocks, ± 60 
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trading days around the announcement of the oil refinery acquisition, and compare Delta Air 
Lines’ share price performance against major US airlines.   
 
Data and Method 
We collected and estimated quarterly data for all variables in Equations 1 and 6 and the 
instrumental variables used in the estimation from Q1 2010 to Q2 2015. All airline financial and 
operations data, as well as the financial market data, come from the US Bureau of Transportation 
Statistics, masFlight, and the websites of Delta Air Lines, Yahoo! Finance, and Bloomberg. The 
GDP quarterly growth rates come from the US Federal Reserve of St. Louis while the PCE and 
TW growth rates come from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis. We conducted internet 
searches for information on Delta Air Lines’ oil refinery acquisition. 
 
We estimated the econometric model using the two-stage least squares (2SLS) with instrumental 
variables for the endogenous variables in Equations 1and 6 and the autoregressive moving 
average (ARMA) model to address autocorrelation (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009; Greene, 1997) 
in the time series quarterly data. In the 2SLS estimation, we used regressors that include ARMA 
terms while the instruments include lagged regressors with ARMA terms. 
 
We also computed for the abnormal returns of Delta Air Lines ± 60 trading days around 5 April 
2012, the announcement date of its oil refinery acquisition, for a total of 121 trading days, which 
is relatively shorter compared with the event studies analyzed by McWilliams and Siegel (1997), 
who argue that shorter event windows tend to capture the impact of an event on share prices. 
Abnormal returns are stock price returns that are significantly different from returns using a 
model that generates ‘normal’ returns (Brown and Warner, 1980; McWilliams and Siegel, 1997), 
while the abnormal return over an event window is a measure of the impact of the event on the 
share price of the firm (Campbell et al., 1997) and event studies using daily stock returns and the 
market-adjusted returns model based on standard parametric tests are well-specified (Brown and 
Warner, 1980 and 1985; Khotari and Warner, 2006). 
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Equation 2 shows the market-adjusted returns model, a linear model that relates stock returns to 
market returns whose error term has an expectation of zero and a variance equal to it2 
(Campbell et al., 1997; MacKinlay, 1997; McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). 
 
Equation 2: itmtiiit RR    
20
ititit
VarandEwhere    
 
We used Equations 3, 4, and 5, based on the market-adjusted returns model (Brown and Warner, 
1985), to compute for the daily abnormal returns of Delta Air Lines and major US airlines. 
 
Equation 3: ntoiforRRA mtitit 1        
 
itA is the excess or abnormal return of security i at time t, itR is the return on stock i at time t, and
mtR is the return on the market index at time t. 
 
Equation 4:      %10011   itititit PPPR    
Equation 5:      %10011   mtmtmtmt IIIR   
 
Results and Analysis 
Table 1 shows the estimation results of the profit equation using Delta Air Lines’ quarterly net 
income as the dependent variable. Only two variables are statistically significant although the 
adjusted R2 of the estimated equation is 0.6563, which is relatively high. An alternative equation 
is presented in Appendix A where the dependent variable is operating income, which is 
somewhat similar to the definition of profitability by Mellat-Parast et al. (2015) using the ratio of 
operating income to operating revenue. The adjusted R2 (0.7615) of the operating income 
equation is higher than the net income equation’s adjusted R2 (0.6563). Moreover, the estimation 
results of the alternative equation differ slightly in that two other variables, FREQUENCY and 
PCE, are significant but with the reverse sign (see Appendix A). 
 
Table 1 Profit equation estimation results 
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      Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic  
     
     Constant -0.7707 2.86 -0.27  
PASSENGER 0.3415 0.14 2.47 ** 
FREQUENCY -0.0340 0.03 -1.18  
ROUTE -0.0010 0.01 -0.09  
PCE -0.0689 0.12 -0.60  
FUEL  -25.5875 6.82 -3.75 *** 
REFINERY 0.2470 0.34 0.72  
 
Adjusted R2    0.6563 
Included observations   22 
     
     Two asterisks (***) indicate significance at the 1% level and two asterisks (**) at the 5% level, while without an 
asterisk is insignificant. 
 
The estimation results of the profit equation in Table 1 indicate that only the number of enplaned 
passengers (PASSENGER) and Delta Air Lines’ fuel cost per ASM (FUEL) tend to predict Delta 
Air Lines’ profitability at least for the period Q1 2010 to Q2 2015. Both variables have the 
correct sign, indicating that more passengers have a positive impact on the airline’s net income 
while a higher fuel cost per ASM, which is largely a function of Delta Air Lines’ aircraft size 
and technology, the average age of its fleet, and the price of jet fuel, invariably results in a lower 
net income. The other control variables such Delta Air Lines’ route network (ROUTE), departure 
frequency (FREQUENCY), and PCE are insignificant in predicting the airline’s profitability. 
 
The variable of interest, REFINERY, is insignificant, however, indicating that any positive 
impact of Delta Air Lines’ oil refinery acquisition on its net income may take longer than the 
period considered in this paper. The insignificance of Delta Air Lines’ oil refinery acquisition 
may be attributed to the short time series used in this study or to the lower oil prices since Delta 
Air Lines’ acquired the oil refinery.   
 
Figure 1 shows the airline’s major sources of revenues, indicating that passenger revenues from 
its mainline and regional operations account for most of Delta Air Lines’ operating revenues. 
The number of passengers not only increases Delta Air Lines’ passenger revenues but also its 
‘other operating revenues’ that usually include passenger-related ancillary revenues from in-
flight internet and entertainment, food and beverage, as well as rebooking and cancelation fees, 
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which invariably result in higher net income, hence, the inclusion of the PASSENGER variable 
in the profit equation. 
 
Figure 1: Delta Air Lines’ major sources of revenues 
 
Source: masFlight, Bloomberg, and Delta Air Lines. 
 
Figure 2: Delta Air Lines’ major cost items  
 
Source: masFlight, Bloomberg, and Delta Air Lines 
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Figure 2 shows the major cost items of Delta Air Lines, indicating that fuel-related expenses are 
highly variable and account for most of Delta Air Lines’ cost of operations, thus, its decision to 
purchase an oil refinery to reduce its fuel expenses and exposure to oil price volatility. The spike 
in fuel-related expenses in Q3 and Q4 2014 is due the airline’s increased fuel consumption and 
hedging losses in the same period. 
 
Figure 3: Delta Air Lines’ fuel expenses, aircraft age, operating expenses, and fuel prices   
 
Source: masFlight and Delta Air Lines 
 
Figure 3 indicates that the trend of Delta Air Lines’ operating expenses is similar to the trend of 
its fuel expense per hundred ASMs and the average age of its aircraft, indicating that lower fuel 
costs as well as operating relatively younger and more efficient aircraft tend to reduce its cost of 
operations. Delta Air Lines has been retiring its older Boeing 757 aircraft as the airline accepts 
delivery of Boeing 737-900 and Airbus 321 aircraft, which are more fuel-efficient. Moreover, its 
order consisting of Airbus 330 and Airbus 350 aircraft, which will be delivered later in this 
decade, will replace its Boeing 747 fleet and some of its older Boeing 767s, resulting in still 
lower fuel cost per ASM. Thus, Delta Air Lines’ use of newer aircraft will invariably result in 
lower fuel costs and operating costs, in general, thereby diminishing any gains the airline initially 
intended to have from its oil refinery purchase.  
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Figure 3 also indicates that Delta Air Lines’ fuel expense per hundred ASMs exhibits an erratic 
behavior despite stable jet fuel prices, suggesting that Delta Air Lines’ fuel hedging strategy may 
not have been effective and the airline cannot fully depend on the market to reduce its jet fuel 
expense per ASM and should look at other sources to reduce its operating costs. Given such 
circumstances, Delta Air Lines’ oil refinery acquisition may be a good strategy in the long term 
since jet fuel prices are expected to increase as demand for air travel increases, not just in a 
growing US economy, but also in emerging markets, specifically in Asia and Latin America, 
where Delta Air Lines has expanded its service. 
 
Figure 4: Delta Air Lines’ fuel expenses, ASMs, departure frequency, and fuel prices 
 
Source: masFlight, Bloomberg, and Yahoo! Finance 
 
Figure 4 shows that the decline in Delta Air Lines’ aircraft fuel-related expenses from Q2 2013 
to Q1 2014 is due to the reduction of its departure frequency, partly due to its use of Boeing 717 
aircraft that replaced inefficient smaller aircraft, resulting in lower ASMs, and not due to lower 
jet fuel prices, which remained relatively stable in the same period. This indicates that Delta Air 
Lines’ fuel hedging strategy is not effective when jet fuel prices are stable and when the airline 
reduces departure frequency as a result of capacity control decisions to boost airfares or due to 
weaker demand. 
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Figure 5: Delta Air Lines’ revenues and net income, PCE growth, and fuel prices 
 
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis, masFlight, Yahoo! Finance, and Bloomberg 
 
Figure 5 shows the behavior of Delta Air Lines’ operating revenues and net income against the 
PCE growth rate and the price of jet fuel from Q1 2010 to Q2 2015. Delta Air Lines’ net income 
tends to stabilize starting Q2 2011 as jet fuel prices stop increasing and remain relatively stable 
from 2011 to 2014. The spike in jet fuel prices and declining PCE growth rate from Q4 2014 to 
Q1 2015, as well as the slowing demand for airline travel in the winter, resulted in Delta Air 
Lines’ USD 1.371 billion loss in Q4 2014. 
 
We computed the abnormal returns of Delta Air Lines’ share prices in the 121-trading day period 
to show its share price performance against its industry and the broader market (Manuela Jr. and 
Rhoades, 2013 and 2014). Figure 6 shows the stock performance of Delta Air Lines against the 
S&P 500 and the XAL using daily abnormal returns (DARs) and cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs), the sum of daily abnormal returns over a period of n days. 
 
Despite the apparent lack of a statistically significant positive impact of Delta Air Lines’ oil 
refinery acquisition on its net income, the stock market has rewarded Delta Air Lines’ bold move 
in its quest to control its fuel expenses. Figure 6 shows Delta Air Lines’ stock price performance 
against the S&P 500 and the XAL. While the DARs tend to fluctuate around zero, the CARs 
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show a positive trend after the announcement of Delta Air Lines’ oil refinery acquisition. The 
airline’s CARs tend to approach zero leading to the announcement date but eventually 
outperformed the S&P 500 and the XAL around 12 trading days before the announcement date. 
Overall investors tend to agree that Delta Air Lines’ bold move should benefit the airline in the 
long term because the airline’s stock prices outperformed both the S&P 500 and the XAL in the 
60-trading day period following its announcement to acquire an oil refinery to boost its fuel 
hedging strategy. As mentioned earlier, the oil refinery reported a profit of USD 19 million in Q3 
2014, followed by a USD 75 million profit in Q4 2014 (Loyd, 2014). 
 
Figure 6: DARs and CARs of Delta Air Lines around the oil refinery acquisition announcement 
 
Source: Yahoo! Finance. 
 
When compared with the stock performance of other US-domiciled major airlines, however, 
Delta Air Lines’ share price performance lags the US Airways Group’s (stock ticker symbol: 
LCC) when the benchmark index is either the S&P 500 (see Figure 7) or the XAL (see Figure 8) 
while its share price performance is almost similar to United Airlines’ CARs (stock ticker 
symbol: UAL) and outperforms Southwest Airlines’ CARs (stock ticker symbol: LUV). The 
share price performance of American Airlines is not included in the analysis because the New 
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York Stock Exchange delisted its shares on 29 December 2011, a month after the airline filed for 
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Protection and Reorganization (Manuela Jr. et al., 2016; Mehta, 2011). 
 
Figure 7: CARs of Major US Airlines Using the S&P 500 as Benchmark Index 
 
Data source: Yahoo! Finance.  
 
The share price performance of the US Airways Group between 10 January and 2 July 2012, the 
observation window for the DARs and CARs in Figures 5, 6, and 7, is largely due to its 
announcement to acquire the bankrupt American Airlines in January 2012 (Joyce, 2012) and its 
improving financial performance since America West Airlines acquired the bankrupt US 
Airways, forming the US Airways Group (Manuela Jr. et al., 2016), while the stock performance 
of United Airlines is due to its improving financial performance since its merger with 
Continental Airlines in October 2010 (Manuela Jr. et al., 2016). Therefore, the share price 
performance of Delta Air Lines may be attributed to its oil refinery acquisition announcement to 
better control is fuel costs in the long term than an industry-wide above-average performance of 
the US airline industry during the observation window because at least one major airline 
(Southwest Airlines) underperformed the S&P 500 and the XAL in the same period while Delta 
Air Lines’ income before income taxes in Q1 and Q2 2012 is low and negative, respectively (see 
Figure 9).  
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Figure 8: CARs of Major US Airlines Using the XAL as Benchmark Index 
 
Data source: Yahoo! Finance. 
 
The positive DARs of Delta Air Lines are statistically significant on four trading days against the 
S&P 500 and five trading days against the XAL in the 60-trading day period before the 
announcement while its positive CARs are statistically significant on 13 and nine trading days 
against the S&P 500 and the XAL, respectively, in the same period. After the announcement, 
Delta Air Lines’ positive DARs are statistically significant three and five trading days against the 
S&P 500 and the XAL, respectively, while its positive CARs are statistically significant on 11 
and 12 trading days against the S&P 500 and the XAL, respectively, in the same period. The 
statistically significant DARs and CARs suggest that Delta Air Lines’ abnormal returns are due 
to its oil refinery acquisition. Appendix B shows the t-statistics of Delta Air Lines’ DARs while 
Appendix C shows the t-statistics of its CARs. 
 
Figure 9 Delta Air Lines’ Financial Performance, Q1 2011 to Q4 2013 
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Source: masFlight, Bloomberg, and Delta Air Lines 
 
Conclusion 
This paper discussed three theoretical perspectives on organizational form—transaction costs 
economics, resource-based view, and resource dependence theory. Each theory seeks to explain, 
even predict, when organizations will take action to alter organizational form in order to better 
achieve their goals and objectives. Transaction costs economics suggests that vertical integration 
improves the ability of the firm to coordinate activities and is useful when demand conditions are 
uncertain and bargaining power with suppliers is low. In the case of the airline industry, the costs 
of overhead and managing an unfamiliar business such as an oil refinery, which is not noted for 
its stability, may not be worth the benefits in economic terms. The resource-based view of the 
firm would seem to argue that airlines stick to what they know best, trying to manage complex 
networks in a highly technical, operationally focused industry. As an organizing concept, 
however, the resource dependence theory does offer the best intuitive explanation for the oil 
refinery acquisition of Delta Air Lines. In an industry that is subject to every whim of the global 
economy, heavily reliant on a resource (oil) that has become as unpredictable as airline financial 
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performance itself, the idea of owning and controlling this volatile resource must have seemed 
quite compelling. 
 
Moreover, this paper has estimated the impact of Delta Air Lines’ oil refinery acquisition on its 
financial and operational performance using quarterly data from Q1 2010 to Q2 2015. The 
estimation results indicate that it may be too early to ascertain whether Delta Air Lines’ oil 
refinery acquisition has any positive impact on its financial and operational performance, 
although Loyd (2014) reports that the refinery posted a profit of USD 19 million and USD 75 
million in Q3 and Q4 2014, respectively. Lower jet fuel prices since Q3 2013 appear to have 
complicated the impact of Delta Air Lines’ oil refinery acquisition on its financial and 
operational performance, as well as the airline’s move to replace its older Boeing 747s, 757s, and 
767s with new and more fuel-efficient aircraft. Overall the results indicate that the number of 
enplaned passengers, invariably resulting in higher load factors, and fuel cost per ASM tend to 
predict Delta Air Lines’ financial performance. Despite the apparent lack of positive impact on 
its net income, however, investors tend to agree that Delta Air Lines’ oil refinery acquisition may 
be a good strategy in the long term, resulting in share prices that outperformed the S&P 500 and 
the XAL in the 60-trading day period following the announcement of its oil refinery acquisition. 
 
Whether greater autonomy and control prove to be worth the cost of purchasing the oil refinery 
and the new complexity and overhead of running the facility remain uncertain, Delta Air Lines’ 
oil refinery acquisition will be a story worth following in the future. 
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Appendix A 
The results of the alternative equation, operating income, are shown in Table 2. We used the 
2SLS to estimate the equation using the same set of instrumental variables for the endogenous 
variables and the ARMA model to address autocorrelation. All variables in Equation 6 are as 
defined in Equation 1.   
 
Equation 6 
OPERATING INCOME (t) = β0 + β1 PASSENGER (t) + β2 FREQUENCY (t) + β3 ROUTE (t) + 
β4 PCE (t) + β5 FUEL (t) + β6 REFINERY (t) + ε  
 
Table 2 Operating income equation estimation results 
     
      Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic  
     
     Constant 3.4086 2.33 1.46  
PASSENGER 0.5297 0.11 4.70 *** 
FREQUENCY -0.0879 0.02 -3.74 *** 
ROUTE 0.0080 0.01 0.84  
PCE -0.1842 0.09 -1.97 * 
FUEL  -29.1084 5.56 -5.24 *** 
REFINERY -0.0219 0.28 -0.08  
 
Adjusted R2    0.7615 
Included observations   22 
     
     Two asterisks (***) indicate significance at the 1% level and one asterisk (*) at the 10% level, while without an 
asterisk is insignificant. 
 
The estimation results in Table 2 indicate that the PASSENGER and FUEL COST variables have 
the same sign as the corresponding variables in Table 1 (profit or net income equation), which 
suggests that these two variables impact operating income and net income (see Equation 1) 
similarly, although the impact of these variables on operating income is greater (compare Table 1 
and Table 2). While two other variables are significant in the operating income equation, these 
variables have the reverse sign, suggesting that the FREQUENCY variable may indicate the 
impact of Delta Air Lines’ unprofitable flights on the airline’s net income while the negative sign 
of the PCE variable may indicate that Delta Air Lines is not the airline of choice when the 
economy is improving, i.e., higher PCE.        
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Appendix B Statistical Significance of Delta Air Lines’ Daily Abnormal Returns 
Date 
DAL-S&P 500 
Trading Day 
DAL-XAL 
DAR t-Statistic DAR t-Statistic 
10-Jan-12 
11-Jan-12 
12-Jan-12 
13-Jan-12 
17-Jan-12 
18-Jan-12 
19-Jan-12 
20-Jan-12 
23-Jan-12 
24-Jan-12 
25-Jan-12 
26-Jan-12 
27-Jan-12 
30-Jan-12 
31-Jan-12 
01-Feb-12 
02-Feb-12 
03-Feb-12 
06-Feb-12 
07-Feb-12 
08-Feb-12 
09-Feb-12 
10-Feb-12 
13-Feb-12 
14-Feb-12 
15-Feb-12 
16-Feb-12 
17-Feb-12 
21-Feb-12 
22-Feb-12 
23-Feb-12 
24-Feb-12 
27-Feb-12 
28-Feb-12 
29-Feb-12 
01-Mar-12 
02-Mar-12 
05-Mar-12 
06-Mar-12 
07-Mar-12 
08-Mar-12 
09-Mar-12 
12-Mar-12 
-1.01% 
4.08% 
2.79% 
0.27% 
-1.71% 
1.07% 
4.10% 
0.79% 
-1.32% 
1.07% 
5.32% 
2.68% 
2.32% 
3.91% 
-2.00% 
2.43% 
1.73% 
0.34% 
-2.70% 
-0.38% 
-0.03% 
1.04% 
-1.38% 
1.71% 
-1.79% 
-0.47% 
-0.18% 
-1.15% 
-7.27% 
-0.86% 
-2.84% 
-1.82% 
1.23% 
2.15% 
-0.44% 
-2.35% 
1.67% 
-0.64% 
-1.67% 
-0.58% 
0.09% 
-1.42% 
-1.94% 
-0.48 
 1.50* 
 1.00 
 0.02 
-0.75 
 0.33 
 1.51* 
 0.22 
-0.60 
 0.33 
 1.98** 
 0.96 
 0.82 
 1.43* 
-0.86 
 0.86 
 0.58 
 0.05 
-1.14 
-0.24 
-0.10 
 0.32 
-0.62 
 0.58 
-0.78 
-0.27 
-0.16 
-0.54 
-2.92*** 
-0.42 
-1.19 
-0.80 
 0.39 
 0.75 
-0.26 
-1.00 
 0.56 
-0.34 
-0.74 
-0.31 
-0.05 
-0.64 
-0.84 
-60 
-59 
-58 
-57 
-56 
-55 
-54 
-53 
-52 
-51 
-50 
-49 
-48 
-47 
-46 
-45 
-44 
-43 
-42 
-41 
-40 
-39 
-38 
-37 
-36 
-35 
-34 
-33 
-32 
-31 
-30 
-29 
-28 
-27 
-26 
-25 
-24 
-23 
-22 
-21 
-20 
-19 
-18 
-1.90% 
3.19% 
2.02% 
0.50% 
-0.68% 
-0.19% 
2.63% 
0.21% 
-0.99% 
0.15% 
3.16% 
0.13% 
0.06% 
2.82% 
-2.43% 
1.31% 
-0.26% 
-0.97% 
-0.41% 
0.16% 
1.15% 
0.86% 
-0.85% 
-0.26% 
-1.52% 
0.10% 
-0.92% 
-0.91% 
-1.75% 
0.38% 
-1.08% 
0.27% 
0.47% 
0.06% 
-0.15% 
-1.42% 
1.32% 
1.00% 
-1.39% 
-0.25% 
-0.47% 
-0.92% 
-0.78% 
-1.23 
 1.87** 
 1.16 
 0.23 
-0.49 
-0.19 
 1.53* 
 0.05 
-0.68 
 0.02 
 1.85** 
 0.00 
-0.04 
 1.65* 
-1.55* 
 0.72 
-0.23 
-0.66 
-0.32 
 0.03 
 0.63 
 0.45 
-0.59 
-0.23 
-0.99 
-0.01 
-0.63 
-0.63 
-1.14 
 0.16 
-0.73 
 0.09 
 0.21 
-0.03 
-0.16 
-0.93 
 0.73 
 0.53 
-0.92 
-0.23 
-0.36 
-0.63 
-0.55 
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13-Mar-12 
14-Mar-12 
15-Mar-12 
16-Mar-12 
19-Mar-12 
20-Mar-12 
21-Mar-12 
22-Mar-12 
23-Mar-12 
26-Mar-12 
27-Mar-12 
28-Mar-12 
29-Mar-12 
30-Mar-12 
02-Apr-12 
03-Apr-12 
04-Apr-12 
05-Apr-12 
09-Apr-12 
10-Apr-12 
11-Apr-12 
12-Apr-12 
13-Apr-12 
16-Apr-12 
17-Apr-12 
18-Apr-12 
19-Apr-12 
20-Apr-12 
23-Apr-12 
24-Apr-12 
25-Apr-12 
26-Apr-12 
27-Apr-12 
30-Apr-12 
01-May-12 
02-May-12 
03-May-12 
04-May-12 
07-May-12 
08-May-12 
09-May-12 
10-May-12 
11-May-12 
14-May-12 
15-May-12 
16-May-12 
-0.51% 
0.01% 
2.95% 
-4.47% 
0.69% 
2.66% 
2.39% 
-1.44% 
0.63% 
1.31% 
-0.43% 
2.43% 
0.86% 
-1.86% 
0.16% 
3.50% 
2.57% 
-0.99% 
0.36% 
-2.96% 
0.27% 
2.15% 
-0.02% 
1.23% 
0.30% 
1.27% 
3.35% 
-0.76% 
-2.51% 
0.50% 
-1.36% 
-1.43% 
3.80% 
1.68% 
0.26% 
-1.38% 
1.59% 
1.98% 
1.51% 
0.43% 
-1.66% 
0.85% 
3.42% 
1.64% 
-1.70% 
2.41% 
-0.29 
-0.08 
 1.06 
-1.83** 
 0.18 
 0.95 
 0.84 
-0.65 
 0.16 
 0.42 
-0.25 
 0.86 
 0.25 
-0.81 
-0.03 
 1.27 
 0.91 
-0.47 
 0.05 
-1.24 
 0.02 
 0.75 
-0.10 
 0.39 
 0.03 
 0.41 
 1.22 
-0.38 
-1.06 
 0.11 
-0.62 
-0.64 
 1.39* 
 0.57 
 0.01 
-0.62 
 0.53 
 0.68 
 0.50 
 0.08 
-0.73 
 0.24 
 1.24 
 0.55 
-0.75 
 0.85 
-17 
-16 
-15 
-14 
-13 
-12 
-11 
-10 
-9 
-8 
-7 
-6 
-5 
-4 
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
-1.22% 
0.51% 
1.21% 
-1.76% 
0.06% 
1.64% 
2.47% 
-0.37% 
-0.14% 
0.13% 
0.47% 
0.96% 
0.49% 
-0.16% 
0.83% 
1.91% 
2.00% 
-0.45% 
0.26% 
-2.37% 
0.03% 
1.53% 
0.03% 
0.75% 
0.19% 
1.94% 
0.30% 
0.16% 
-1.15% 
-0.04% 
-1.12% 
-0.47% 
2.06% 
1.94% 
1.42% 
-1.81% 
0.78% 
0.34% 
-0.72% 
1.05% 
-0.78% 
0.47% 
2.20% 
2.00% 
-0.78% 
1.92% 
-0.81 
 0.24 
 0.66 
-1.14 
-0.04 
 0.93 
 1.43* 
-0.30 
-0.16 
 0.01 
 0.21 
 0.51 
 0.23 
-0.17 
 0.43 
 1.09 
 1.14 
-0.34 
 0.09 
-1.51* 
-0.05 
 0.86 
-0.05 
 0.39 
 0.05 
 1.11 
 0.11 
 0.02 
-0.77 
-0.10 
-0.75 
-0.36 
 1.18 
 1.11 
 0.79 
-1.17 
 0.40 
 0.13 
-0.51 
 0.56 
-0.55 
 0.21 
 1.26 
 1.14 
-0.55 
 1.09 
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17-May-12 
18-May-12 
21-May-12 
22-May-12 
23-May-12 
24-May-12 
25-May-12 
29-May-12 
30-May-12 
31-May-12 
01-Jun-12 
04-Jun-12 
05-Jun-12 
06-Jun-12 
07-Jun-12 
08-Jun-12 
11-Jun-12 
12-Jun-12 
13-Jun-12 
14-Jun-12 
15-Jun-12 
18-Jun-12 
19-Jun-12 
20-Jun-12 
21-Jun-12 
22-Jun-12 
25-Jun-12 
26-Jun-12 
27-Jun-12 
28-Jun-12 
29-Jun-12 
02-Jul-12 
-7.10% 
-1.85% 
2.74% 
-0.43% 
1.73% 
4.80% 
1.10% 
2.67% 
1.01% 
3.21% 
-2.41% 
-11.57% 
3.36% 
-2.02% 
-3.10% 
0.16% 
-0.76% 
-2.44% 
3.19% 
0.47% 
-2.85% 
3.46% 
1.65% 
2.92% 
2.40% 
-2.41% 
-3.11% 
5.42% 
-1.53% 
1.02% 
-4.37% 
1.31% 
-2.85*** 
-0.81 
 0.98 
-0.25 
 0.59 
 1.78** 
 0.34 
 0.95 
 0.31 
 1.16 
-1.03 
-4.59*** 
 1.22 
-0.87 
-1.29* 
-0.02 
-0.38 
-1.04 
 1.16 
 0.10 
-1.20 
 1.26 
 0.56 
 1.05 
 0.85 
-1.03 
-1.30* 
 2.02** 
-0.68 
 0.31 
-1.79** 
 0.42 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
-3.98% 
-1.20% 
2.39% 
0.98% 
1.00% 
1.60% 
-0.03% 
2.71% 
0.84% 
0.20% 
-2.04% 
-7.32% 
2.81% 
-1.98% 
-2.68% 
-0.52% 
0.57% 
-2.18% 
1.59% 
0.23% 
-1.66% 
2.30% 
0.24% 
0.98% 
0.68% 
-2.30% 
-1.93% 
5.48% 
-1.56% 
1.45% 
-2.53% 
0.09% 
-2.50*** 
-0.80 
 1.38* 
 0.52 
 0.54 
 0.90 
-0.09 
 1.58* 
 0.44 
 0.05 
-1.31* 
-4.53*** 
 1.64* 
-1.28 
-1.70** 
-0.39 
 0.28 
-1.40* 
 0.90 
 0.07 
-1.08 
 1.33* 
 0.07 
 0.52 
 0.34 
-1.47* 
-1.25 
 3.26*** 
-1.02 
 0.81 
-1.61* 
-0.02 
Appendix B shows the significance of the daily abnormal returns (DARs) of Delta Air Lines (DAL) ±60 trading 
days around the oil refinery acquisition announcement on 5 April 2012. Three asterisks (***) indicate that the DAR 
is significant at the 1%, two asterisks (**) at the 5%, and one asterisk (*) at the 10% level. 
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Appendix C Statistical Significance of Delta Air Lines’ Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Date 
DAL-S&P 500 
Trading Day 
DAL-XAL 
CAR t-Statistic CAR t-Statistic 
10-Jan-12 
11-Jan-12 
12-Jan-12 
13-Jan-12 
17-Jan-12 
18-Jan-12 
19-Jan-12 
20-Jan-12 
23-Jan-12 
24-Jan-12 
25-Jan-12 
26-Jan-12 
27-Jan-12 
30-Jan-12 
31-Jan-12 
01-Feb-12 
02-Feb-12 
03-Feb-12 
06-Feb-12 
07-Feb-12 
08-Feb-12 
09-Feb-12 
10-Feb-12 
13-Feb-12 
14-Feb-12 
15-Feb-12 
16-Feb-12 
17-Feb-12 
21-Feb-12 
22-Feb-12 
23-Feb-12 
24-Feb-12 
27-Feb-12 
28-Feb-12 
29-Feb-12 
01-Mar-12 
02-Mar-12 
05-Mar-12 
06-Mar-12 
07-Mar-12 
08-Mar-12 
09-Mar-12 
12-Mar-12 
-1.0% 
3.1% 
5.9% 
6.1% 
4.4% 
5.5% 
9.6% 
10.4% 
9.1% 
10.1% 
15.4% 
18.1% 
20.4% 
24.4% 
22.4% 
24.8% 
26.5% 
26.9% 
24.2% 
23.8% 
23.7% 
24.8% 
23.4% 
25.1% 
23.3% 
22.8% 
22.7% 
21.5% 
14.2% 
13.4% 
10.5% 
8.7% 
9.9% 
12.1% 
11.7% 
9.3% 
11.0% 
10.3% 
8.7% 
8.1% 
8.2% 
6.8% 
4.8% 
-2.22** 
-1.76** 
-1.44* 
-1.40* 
-1.60* 
-1.48* 
-1.01 
-0.92 
-1.07 
-0.95 
-0.34 
-0.03 
 0.24 
 0.69 
 0.46 
 0.74 
 0.93 
 0.97 
 0.66 
 0.62 
 0.62 
 0.73 
 0.58 
 0.77 
 0.57 
 0.51 
 0.49 
 0.36 
-0.47 
-0.57 
-0.90 
-1.11 
-0.97 
-0.72 
-0.77 
-1.04 
-0.85 
-0.92 
-1.11 
-1.18 
-1.17 
-1.33* 
-1.55* 
-60 
-59 
-58 
-57 
-56 
-55 
-54 
-53 
-52 
-51 
-50 
-49 
-48 
-47 
-46 
-45 
-44 
-43 
-42 
-41 
-40 
-39 
-38 
-37 
-36 
-35 
-34 
-33 
-32 
-31 
-30 
-29 
-28 
-27 
-26 
-25 
-24 
-23 
-22 
-21 
-20 
-19 
-18 
-1.90% 
1.29% 
3.31% 
3.81% 
3.13% 
2.94% 
5.58% 
5.78% 
4.79% 
4.94% 
8.10% 
8.23% 
8.29% 
11.11% 
8.68% 
9.99% 
9.73% 
8.76% 
8.36% 
8.52% 
9.66% 
10.52% 
9.67% 
9.42% 
7.90% 
8.00% 
7.08% 
6.17% 
4.42% 
4.80% 
3.73% 
3.99% 
4.46% 
4.52% 
4.38% 
2.96% 
4.28% 
5.28% 
3.89% 
3.64% 
3.16% 
2.24% 
1.46% 
-2.03** 
-1.49* 
-1.14 
-1.06 
-1.17 
-1.21 
-0.76 
-0.72 
-0.89 
-0.87 
-0.33 
-0.31 
-0.30 
0.18 
-0.23 
-0.01 
-0.05 
-0.22 
-0.29 
-0.26 
-0.07 
0.08 
-0.06 
-0.11 
-0.36 
-0.35 
-0.50 
-0.66 
-0.96 
-0.89 
-1.07 
-1.03 
-0.95 
-0.94 
-0.96 
-1.20 
-0.98 
-0.81 
-1.05 
-1.09 
-1.17 
-1.32* 
-1.46* 
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13-Mar-12 
14-Mar-12 
15-Mar-12 
16-Mar-12 
19-Mar-12 
20-Mar-12 
21-Mar-12 
22-Mar-12 
23-Mar-12 
26-Mar-12 
27-Mar-12 
28-Mar-12 
29-Mar-12 
30-Mar-12 
02-Apr-12 
03-Apr-12 
04-Apr-12 
05-Apr-12 
09-Apr-12 
10-Apr-12 
11-Apr-12 
12-Apr-12 
13-Apr-12 
16-Apr-12 
17-Apr-12 
18-Apr-12 
19-Apr-12 
20-Apr-12 
23-Apr-12 
24-Apr-12 
25-Apr-12 
26-Apr-12 
27-Apr-12 
30-Apr-12 
01-May-12 
02-May-12 
03-May-12 
04-May-12 
07-May-12 
08-May-12 
09-May-12 
10-May-12 
11-May-12 
14-May-12 
15-May-12 
16-May-12 
4.3% 
4.3% 
7.3% 
2.8% 
3.5% 
6.2% 
8.5% 
7.1% 
7.7% 
9.1% 
8.6% 
11.1% 
11.9% 
10.1% 
10.2% 
13.7% 
16.3% 
15.3% 
15.7% 
12.7% 
13.0% 
15.1% 
15.1% 
16.4% 
16.7% 
17.9% 
21.3% 
20.5% 
18.0% 
18.5% 
17.1% 
15.7% 
19.5% 
21.2% 
21.4% 
20.1% 
21.7% 
23.6% 
25.1% 
25.6% 
23.9% 
24.8% 
28.2% 
29.8% 
28.1% 
30.5% 
-1.61* 
-1.61* 
-1.27 
-1.79** 
-1.71** 
-1.40* 
-1.13 
-1.29* 
-1.22 
-1.07 
-1.12 
-0.84 
-0.74 
-0.95 
-0.93 
-0.53 
-0.24 
-0.35 
-0.31 
-0.65 
-0.62 
-0.37 
-0.37 
-0.23 
-0.20 
-0.05 
 0.33 
 0.25 
-0.04 
 0.02 
-0.14 
-0.31 
 0.13 
 0.32 
 0.35 
 0.19 
 0.38 
 0.60 
 0.78 
 0.83 
 0.64 
 0.73 
 1.13 
 1.31* 
 1.12 
 1.40* 
-17 
-16 
-15 
-14 
-13 
-12 
-11 
-10 
-9 
-8 
-7 
-6 
-5 
-4 
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
0.24% 
0.75% 
1.96% 
0.20% 
0.26% 
1.90% 
4.37% 
4.00% 
3.86% 
3.99% 
4.45% 
5.41% 
5.90% 
5.75% 
6.57% 
8.48% 
10.47% 
10.03% 
10.29% 
7.92% 
7.96% 
9.49% 
9.52% 
10.27% 
10.47% 
12.41% 
12.71% 
12.87% 
11.72% 
11.68% 
10.56% 
10.09% 
12.15% 
14.09% 
15.51% 
13.70% 
14.47% 
14.81% 
14.09% 
15.14% 
14.35% 
14.83% 
17.02% 
19.02% 
18.24% 
20.15% 
-1.66** 
-1.58* 
-1.37* 
-1.67** 
-1.66** 
-1.38* 
-0.96 
-1.03 
-1.05 
-1.03 
-0.95 
-0.79 
-0.70 
-0.73 
-0.59 
-0.27 
0.07 
0.00 
0.04 
-0.36 
-0.36 
-0.10 
-0.09 
0.04 
0.07 
0.40 
0.45 
0.48 
0.28 
0.28 
0.09 
0.01 
0.36 
0.69 
0.93 
0.62 
0.75 
0.81 
0.69 
0.86 
0.73 
0.81 
1.18 
1.52* 
1.39* 
1.71** 
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17-May-12 
18-May-12 
21-May-12 
22-May-12 
23-May-12 
24-May-12 
25-May-12 
29-May-12 
30-May-12 
31-May-12 
01-Jun-12 
04-Jun-12 
05-Jun-12 
06-Jun-12 
07-Jun-12 
08-Jun-12 
11-Jun-12 
12-Jun-12 
13-Jun-12 
14-Jun-12 
15-Jun-12 
18-Jun-12 
19-Jun-12 
20-Jun-12 
21-Jun-12 
22-Jun-12 
25-Jun-12 
26-Jun-12 
27-Jun-12 
28-Jun-12 
29-Jun-12 
02-Jul-12 
23.4% 
21.6% 
24.3% 
23.9% 
25.6% 
30.4% 
31.5% 
34.2% 
35.2% 
38.4% 
36.0% 
24.4% 
27.8% 
25.8% 
22.7% 
22.8% 
22.1% 
19.6% 
22.8% 
23.3% 
20.4% 
23.9% 
25.5% 
28.5% 
30.9% 
28.5% 
25.3% 
30.8% 
29.2% 
30.3% 
25.9% 
27.2% 
 0.58 
 0.37 
 0.68 
 0.63 
 0.83 
 1.38* 
 1.51* 
 1.82** 
 1.93** 
 2.30** 
 2.02** 
 0.70 
 1.08 
 0.85 
 0.49 
 0.51 
 0.42 
 0.14 
 0.51 
 0.56 
 0.24 
 0.63 
 0.82 
 1.16 
 1.44* 
 1.16 
 0.80 
 1.42* 
 1.25 
 1.37* 
 0.86 
 1.01 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
16.17% 
14.97% 
17.36% 
18.34% 
19.34% 
20.93% 
20.91% 
23.62% 
24.46% 
24.66% 
22.62% 
15.30% 
18.11% 
16.12% 
13.45% 
12.93% 
13.50% 
11.31% 
12.91% 
13.14% 
11.48% 
13.78% 
14.02% 
14.99% 
15.68% 
13.38% 
11.44% 
16.92% 
15.36% 
16.81% 
14.29% 
14.38% 
1.04 
0.83 
1.24 
1.41* 
1.58* 
1.85** 
1.84** 
2.30** 
2.45*** 
2.48*** 
2.13** 
0.89 
1.37* 
1.03 
0.58 
0.49 
0.59 
0.21 
0.48 
0.52 
0.24 
0.63 
0.67 
0.84 
0.96 
0.56 
0.24 
1.17 
0.90 
1.15 
0.72 
0.74 
Appendix C shows the significance of the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of Delta Air Lines (DAL) ±60 
trading days around the oil refinery acquisition announcement on 5 April 2012. Three asterisks (***) indicate that 
the CAR is significant at the 1% level, two asterisks (**) at the 5% level, and one asterisk (*) at the 10% level. 
 
 
